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ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS:
POWER AND PROCEDURE
Rachel Bayefsky*
Federal courts are often asked to issue various forms of expedited relief, including
stays pending appeal. This Article explores a little examined device that federal courts
employ to freeze legal proceedings until they are able to rule on a party’s request for a
stay pending appeal: the “administrative” or “temporary” stay. A decision whether to
impose an administrative stay can have significant effects in the real world, as
illustrated by recent high-profile litigation on topics including immigration and
abortion. Yet federal courts have not endorsed a uniform standard for determining
whether an administrative stay is warranted or clarified the basis for their power to
issue such a stay. This Article draws attention to the administrative stay device and
proposes standards to guide federal courts in determining when such a stay is
appropriate. In so doing, the Article probes the bounds of federal courts’ equitable
authority and the interests underlying their decisions about whether to grant interim
relief in response to claims of impending harm.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts issue “administrative” or “temporary” stays of
litigation to freeze legal proceedings until the court can rule on a
party’s request for expedited relief. Say that a party loses in district
court and files an appeal. The appellant may seek a stay of the district
court’s judgment pending appeal. The appellant may argue that the
district court’s judgment will violate fundamental rights or destroy
property that is difficult to value; thus, a stay pending appeal is needed
to prevent “irreparable harm.” The court deciding whether to grant a
stay pending appeal must consider factors such as the likelihood that
the stay applicant will succeed on the merits and the prospect of
irreparable harm to the stay applicant.1 The judges may wish to spend
some time considering these factors. Therefore, the court may issue
an “administrative” or “temporary” stay of the district court’s
judgment while the motion for a stay pending appeal is under review.
The decision whether to grant or deny an administrative stay has
real-world stakes. During the coronavirus pandemic in the spring of
2020, for example, the Governor of Texas issued an executive order
postponing various medical procedures without exempting abortion.2
Abortion providers challenged the executive order in federal court as
a constitutional violation, and the federal district judge twice blocked
enforcement of the order as applied to abortion procedures.3 Each
1 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009).
2 See In re Abbott (Abbott I), 954 F.3d 772, 777–78 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott V), 141 S.
Ct. 1261 (2021) (mem.).
3 For discussion of the procedural history of the litigation, see In re Abbott (Abbott
II), 800 F. App’x 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Abbott I, 954 F.3d at 778.
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time, Texas officials appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, seeking expedited relief overturning the district judge’s order.
The Fifth Circuit issued administrative stays of the district court’s
decisions.4 One such stay had a carve-out for women who would be
pushed past the legal limit for abortion in Texas during pendency of
the Governor’s executive order.5 Portions of the Fifth Circuit’s two
administrative stays lasted nineteen days in total and, each time,
preceded a grant of interim relief blocking or narrowing the district
court’s rulings.6 Ultimately, the case was mooted by issuance of a new
executive order.7
Both supporters and detractors of the Fifth Circuit’s administrative stays pointed to serious consequences of the decision whether
to employ the device. Judge James L. Dennis, dissenting from a
decision in which his colleagues voted to maintain an administrative
stay, protested that the district court had “found that temporarily
barring [abortion providers] from performing these procedures would
permanently deny many people the fundamental bodily autonomy to
which they are constitutionally entitled and subject many more to
greatly increased financial costs and elevated risk to their health, safety,
and general well-being.”8 By contrast, the Texas officials argued that
an administrative stay was needed “to preserve the State’s power to
combat the worst public-health emergency in over a century.”9
The Texas executive order case is just one in which courts
deciding whether to enter an administrative stay must confront
arguments about the substantial practical effects of their rulings. The
Ninth Circuit in September 2020, for example, declined to issue an
administrative stay of a district court’s injunction preventing the
Trump administration from setting an earlier date for the end of data
collection for the decennial census.10 “Given the extraordinary
importance of the census,” the Ninth Circuit explained, “it is
imperative that the [Census] Bureau conduct the census in a manner
that is most likely to produce a workable report in which the public
can have confidence.”11 Judge Patrick Bumatay, in dissent, urged that
4 Abbott I, 954 F.3d at 781.
5 Abbott II, 800 F. App’x at 296. At one point during the litigation, the Fifth Circuit
dissolved the administrative stay as applied to medication abortions. See In re Abbott (Abbott
IV), 809 F. App’x 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
6 See Abbott IV, 809 F. App’x at 201.
7 See Abbott V, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021).
8 In re Abbott (Abbott III), 800 F. App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
9 Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Emergency Motion to Lift Temp. Admin.
Stay at 1, Abbott II, 800 F. App’x 293 (No. 20-50296).
10 Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2020).
11 Id. at 702.
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the Ninth Circuit should have issued an administrative stay to blunt the
effects of a ruling by an “adventurous district court” that “injected
itself into a sensitive and politically fraught arena: the 2020 census.”12
There is evidence that administrative stays are becoming both
more common and more contentious, as they are applied in fastmoving cases involving topics such as election rules and pandemic
restrictions.13 Perhaps the most high-profile recent controversy over
the stakes of granting or denying an administrative stay comes from
litigation over another Texas abortion-related law, S.B. 8. Passed in
2021, S.B. 8 bans physicians from performing abortions upon
detection of a fetal heartbeat and authorizes private citizens to sue to
enforce the law.14 After initially declining to enjoin the law, the
Supreme Court, on October 22, 2021, set constitutional challenges to
S.B. 8 for argument on November 1.15 Justice Sotomayor, dissenting
in part, argued that the Court should have “stay[ed] administratively
the Fifth Circuit’s order” while the case was being heard.16 In Justice
Sotomayor’s view, S.B. 8’s presence was causing “irreparable harm” to
women seeking abortions.17 “Whatever equities favor caution in
staying a state law under normal circumstances,” Justice Sotomayor
wrote, “cannot outweigh the total and intentional denial of a
constitutional right to women while this Court considers the serious
questions presented.”18
Despite the impact of federal courts’ decisions to grant or
withhold an administrative stay, there is little scholarly or judicial
discussion of the inquiry that courts should undertake when making
these decisions. The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance
on the conditions under which it will grant an administrative stay—
and, with a few exceptions, neither have the federal courts of appeals.19
Although scholars have become more interested in emergency orders

12 Id. at 703, 712 (Bumatay, J., dissenting).
13 See infra text at note 116 (detailing uptick in incidence of references to
administrative stays in federal courts in Westlaw research database).
14 Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 530 (2021).
15 United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2021) (mem).
16 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 15–16. After holding oral argument, the Court issued an opinion concluding
that a lawsuit by abortion providers might be able to proceed against certain defendants,
but not others. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 530 (2021).
19 For federal courts of appeals decisions featuring some explanation of the decision
to grant or withhold an administrative stay, see, for example, In re Abbott (Abbott II), 800 F.
App’x 293, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223
(9th Cir. 2019); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2011).
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and the Supreme Court’s emergency or “shadow” docket,20 they have
not yet turned their attention to the approach that federal courts
ought to take toward administrative stay requests.21
The issue of when federal courts should grant administrative stays
raises both conceptual and practical questions. How exactly does an
“administrative” stay differ from a “regular” stay pending appeal? To
what extent should federal courts imposing administrative stays
consider the factors that govern the entry of stays pending appeal in
general—notably the likelihood of success on the merits?22 Sometimes
administrative stays are described as devices meant simply to preserve
the status quo for a brief period while the court adjudicates a motion
for a stay pending appeal.23 But that description is not straightforward.
First, it is not always easy to ascertain what counts as the status quo.24
Is it the state of affairs that would have existed absent the district
court’s judgment—for example, in the Texas pandemic case described
above, the situation in which the Texas Governor’s order barring
certain abortions was effective? Or is it the state of affairs that exists in
light of the district court’s judgment? Second, the temporary aspect of
administrative stays raises issues about how long they are to last. A
recent Ninth Circuit administrative stay of a district court’s order
requiring Los Angeles to make significant changes to its homelessness
policies lasted over four months;25 another Ninth Circuit
administrative stay, in a case involving federal officers’ policing
practices, lasted one-and-a-half months.26 Is there a basis for suggesting
that these administrative stays lasted too long?

20 See, e.g., William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1 (2015); Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor, The Precedential Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Emergency Stays, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827 (2021); Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay,
The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019).
21 In an illuminating article about stays in general, Portia Pedro briefly discusses
administrative stay determinations. See Portia Pedro, Stays, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 869, 886 n.97
(2018). For another instructive article on stays, see Jill Wieber Lens, Stays of Injunctive Relief
Pending Appeal: Why the Merits Should Not Matter, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1319 (2016).
22 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). For divergent judicial views on whether
to consider the merits in granting or denying an administrative stay, compare, for example,
Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 2020) (administrative stay “only
intended to preserve the status quo until the substantive motion for a stay pending appeal
can be considered on the merits, and does not constitute in any way a decision as to the
merits of the motion for stay pending appeal”) (quoting Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222,
1223 (9th Cir. 2019)), with id. at 705 (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (“We should have granted
an administrative stay here because defendants are likely to succeed on the merits.”).
23 See, e.g., Ross, 977 F.3d at 700–01 (citing Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th
Cir. 2019)).
24 See infra text at notes 102–13.
25 L.A. All. for Hum. Rts. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2021).
26 Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2020).
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All these questions raise the issue of whether administrative stay
procedures lead to more contentious short-fuse litigation instead of
lowering the temperature in emergency proceedings. The label
“administrative” stay may be read to imply that these devices are
ministerial, routine, or value-neutral. But administrative stays actually
require courts to make significant and potentially value-laden choices
in a short period of time.
Further, tied up with questions about the appropriate standard
for granting or denying administrative stays are issues about federal
courts’ authority for issuing such relief. Do federal courts have a
statutory basis to impose administrative stays, or are they exercising
inherent equitable or docket-management powers? The source of
legal authority could affect the standard for granting an administrative
stay. For example, if one views administrative stays as exercises of
traditional equitable powers and takes a historical approach toward
these powers,27 then federal courts’ authority to grant administrative
stays may be bounded by historical practice.
These kinds of questions are currently unanswered; indeed, they
are rarely even asked. Accordingly, this Article’s first aim is to shed
light on courts’ practices in the area of administrative stays.28 The
Article’s second aim is to explore the legal basis for administrative stays
and the interests that should guide courts in exercising their authority
in this area. Federal courts, the Article indicates, have the power to
issue administrative stays under their inherent authority to control
their dockets and the All Writs Act. The Article identifies interests that
properly guide federal courts in wielding their power to grant
administrative stays, including the promotion of judicial deliberation,
the efficiency of litigation procedures, the consistency of court
judgments, the legitimacy of court rulings, the practice of judicial
reason-giving, and adherence to the “passive virtues.” Rulemaking
bodies or courts drawing on these interests could create standards to
guide decision-making with respect to administrative stays.
In terms of the contents of these standards, the Article considers
various possibilities, ranging from “no administrative stays” to
“administrative stays in every case.” The Article then makes the

27 See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
318 (1999).
28 This article focuses largely on stays of district-court judgments imposing equitable
relief. However, there are also procedures for appellants to secure stays of district-court
money judgments by posting a bond. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b), (g); see also Lens, supra note
21, at 1322 (“Many courts describe this Rule as automatically entitling the applicant to a
stay as a matter of ‘right’ once the bond is posted.”); Pedro, supra note 21, at 873 n.12
(“[T]he substance and procedure of stay determinations in actions for damages is arguably
clearer than that of those involving injunctive relief.”).
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following proposal. Courts should not undertake any significant
analysis of the merits in deciding whether to grant an administrative
stay; they should tie administrative stays directly to another form of
emergency relief, usually a stay pending appeal; and they should issue
a highly expedited briefing schedule for the stay pending appeal in the
same order in which they grant an administrative stay. These steps
would help to underscore that administrative stays are a docketmanagement device rather than an occasion for courts to opine on a
controversial matter.
With respect to more specific standards, courts should focus on
the impact on the parties during the brief period when an
administrative stay is in effect. In particular, courts ought to weigh (a)
the extent to which the administrative stay applicant would be able to
benefit from a stay pending appeal were the administrative stay denied;
and (b) the extent to which the party opposing an administrative stay
would be able to benefit from the judgment under review were the
administrative stay granted. The Article applies this proposal to
concrete examples.
The proposed inquiry is not a mechanical one; it requires a degree
of discretion. Yet the Article’s proposal would create a more
regularized inquiry for courts considering administrative stays. In the
end, the goal is to start—not finish—a conversation about how federal
courts should use their powers to grant administrative stays,
particularly in the pressurized environment that motions for interim
relief frequently involve.
Part I provides background on stays in general and explains
courts’ practices regarding administrative stays. Part II identifies
sources for federal courts’ authority to grant administrative stays. Part
III discusses interests that should guide courts in issuing administrative
stays and presents a proposal for courts’ treatment of this device.
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS: THE LAY OF THE LAND

This Part first provides context for the discussion of administrative
stays by laying out the powers and standards that federal courts invoke
in granting stays more broadly (Section I.A). The Part then
summarizes federal courts’ current practices with respect to
administrative stays (Section II.B).
A. Stays in General
A stay, as the Supreme Court stated in the 2009 case Nken v. Holder,
is a court order that “hold[s] a ruling in abeyance to allow” a tribunal
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“the time necessary to review it.”29 A court may stay its own judgments
or those of tribunals it is charged with reviewing—including both lower
courts and administrative agencies.
In terms of the basis for federal courts’ power to issue stays, the
Supreme Court in Nken attributed to appellate courts an “inherent”
power “to hold an order in abeyance while it assesses the legality of the
order.”30 The Court explained that this power had been “preserved in
the grant of authority to federal courts to ‘issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.’”31 The “all writs” language is from the
All Writs Act, which originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and is now
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).32
Although Nken sometimes referred to the powers of federal
appellate courts, federal district courts considering whether to stay their
own judgments also cite Nken, and the Supreme Court has stated that
“the factors regulating the issuance of a stay” by “district courts and
courts of appeals” are “generally the same.”33 Subject-specific statutes
may also provide for stays in certain circumstances, such as the
“automatic stay” in bankruptcy.34
For federal district courts and courts of appeals, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) work
in concert to govern the authority of these courts to stay district-court
judgments.35 Rule 62 specifies that actions seeking injunctions are not
stayed “even if an appeal is taken” “[u]nless the court orders
otherwise.”36 Rule 8(a) provides that a party seeking a stay of a district
court’s judgment pending appeal must “ordinarily” first seek such
relief from the district court.37 If moving first in the district court
would be “impracticable,” or if the district court denies the motion for
29 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009). Both courts and administrative agencies
can issue stays. See L. Harold Levinson, Interim Relief in Administrative Procedure: Judicial Stay,
Administrative Stay, and Other Interim Administrative Measures, 42 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 639, 639
(Supp. 1994). This Article concerns stays that courts issue.
30 Nken, 556 U.S. at 426 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)).
31 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)).
32 See All Writs Act, ch. 231, §§ 234, 261–62, 36 Stat. 1156, 1156, 1162 (1911) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018)); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10
n.4 (1942) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1934))); Lens, supra note 21, at 1321 & n.7 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (2016)).
33 Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).
34 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a).
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c). Rule 62 also preserves appellate courts’ authority to stay
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal, or “to issue an order to preserve the status
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment to be entered.” Id. at 62(g)(1)–(2).
37 FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1).
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a stay, then the party may seek a stay of the district court’s judgment
from the court of appeals.38 The advisory committee’s notes to Rule
8(a) state that “[w]hile the power of a court of appeals to stay
proceedings in the district court during the pendency of an appeal is
not explicitly conferred by statute, it exists by virtue of the all writs
statute.”39 Thus, as a leading treatise observes, Rule 8 “may even be
regarded as a reiteration of the power that the All Writs Act already
provides.”40
The U.S. Supreme Court’s authority to stay lower court decisions,
for its part, derives both from the All Writs Act and from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101(f).41 The latter statute provides for either a lower-court judge
or a Supreme Court justice to stay a judgment subject to review by the
Supreme Court “for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to
obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.”42 The Supreme
Court’s Rules then specify that “[a] stay may be granted by a Justice as
permitted by law.”43 What if the Justices wish for the stay to remain in
effect while the Court decides the merits of a case in which it has
granted certiorari? The Supreme Court Rules’ proviso “as permitted
by law” suggests that the Supreme Court has the power to stay cases
pending resolution of the merits as far as is acceptable under another
source of law, such as the All Writs Act. To the extent § 2101(f) does
not already authorize the Supreme Court to stay cases pending
resolution of a case on the merits—beyond resolution of the certiorari
petition44—the All Writs Act likely confers such authority.45 Thus, the
Supreme Court may issue a stay that remains in effect while the Court
decides a case on the merits. Similar to Rule 8(a), Supreme Court
rules require parties initially to seek a stay from the court that issued
the relevant judgment except in “extraordinary” circumstances.46
Both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have
established more specific procedures for parties to seek stays pending
appeal. These procedures are enshrined in the Federal Rules of Civil

38 Id. at 8(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
39 FED. R. APP. P. 8(a) advisory committee’s note to 1967 adoption.
40 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2908 (3d
ed. 2021).
41 See Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of A Single Justice of the Supreme
Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1166–68 (2008); Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme
Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1023–24 (1985);
Vladeck, supra note 20, at 129.
42 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (2018).
43 SUP. CT. R. 23.
44 See Gonen, supra note 41, at 1167.
45 See Scali, supra note 41, at 1025, n.30.
46 See SUP. CT. R. 23(3).
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and Appellate Procedure;47 in rules promulgated by each circuit
court;48 and in the Supreme Court’s rules.49 There are also rules
governing stay procedures in more specific areas of law,50 such as death
penalty cases,51 bankruptcy,52 and class actions.53
As to the substantive standards for issuing a stay, the most
prominent case is again Nken. There, an immigrant sought to stay a
Board of Immigration Appeals removal order pending a petition to the
Fourth Circuit to review that order.54 The Supreme Court held that
the “traditional” standard for a stay applied and described that
standard as one in which the court considers “four factors:”
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he
is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. 55

“The first two factors . . . are the most critical.”56 As the Court noted,
“[t]here is substantial overlap between these [Nken factors] and the
factors governing preliminary injunctions,”57 although a stay, “instead
of directing the conduct of a particular actor, . . . operates on the
judicial proceeding itself.”58
When it comes to the Supreme Court, the standard for that body
to stay a lower court’s ruling is that the stay applicant must show: “(1)
a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue
sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a
majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3)
a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a
stay.”59 Further, “[i]n close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court will
47 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 62(g); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a).
48 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
49 See SUP. CT. R. 23.
50 See Pedro, supra note 21, at 883.
51 See, e.g., 3D CIR. R. 8.3.
52 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 8025.
53 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
54 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009).
55 Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
56 Id.
57 Id. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
58 Nken, 556 U.S. at 428. For discussion of the preliminary injunction standard, see,
for example, John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 33 (2007).
59 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); see also Little v.
Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant of stay).
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balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and
to the respondent.”60 “A single justice can grant or deny the
application for a stay . . . or refer the application for a stay to the full
Court,”61 though in practice a single Justice will usually refer the stay
application to the Court as a whole if the stay application raises
“important or complex questions.”62
To summarize: federal courts have an “inherent” power to issue
stays that is grounded in the All Writs Act and governed by standards
set out in court rules and judicial precedent. The most significant
components of the standard for granting a stay are the likelihood of
success on the merits and the prospect of irreparable harm.
B. Administrative Stays
“Administrative stay” does not have a precise definition in current
doctrine, and the relationship between administrative and “regular”
stays is not clear cut.63 The Ninth Circuit recently characterized an
administrative stay as a device that is “only intended to preserve the
status quo until the substantive motion for a stay pending appeal can
be considered on the merits,” and that “does not constitute in any way
a decision as to the merits of the motion for stay pending appeal.”64
Yet these characteristics of administrative stays are not uniform or
uncontroversial—as this Section explains in detailing courts’ existing
practices with respect to administrative stays.
1. Connection to Another Form of Emergency Relief
A key feature of administrative stays is that they are issued in
connection with another form of emergency relief. In a common
pattern, a court of appeals issues an administrative stay while it
considers a motion for a stay of a district court’s judgment pending

60
61
62

Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190.
Pedro, supra note 21, at 884.
See Gonen, supra note 41, at 1173 (quoting EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S.
GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 6.5, at 399 (9th ed. 2007)).
63 “Administrative stay” may be used to describe any stay of administrative action. See,
e.g., Novo Nordisk Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., No. 21-00806, 2021 WL
3668168, at *3 (D.N.J. June 1, 2021). Particularly in recent years, however, “administrative
stay” has been used specifically to refer to court orders putting judgments on hold in a timelimited way. This Article focuses on the latter usage.
64 Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Doe #1 v.
Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019)).
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appeal.65 The rules of some federal courts of appeals contemplate such
procedures; for example, the Eighth Circuit’s local rules state that
“one judge of the court may order a temporary stay of any proceeding
pending the determination of a stay application by a three-judge
panel.”66 Some courts of appeals single out certain categories of
cases—such as capital cases67 and immigration cases in which an
immigrant faces deportation68— and provide for courts in those cases
to grant a temporary stay while a motion for another form of
emergency relief is pending.
Application of a two-step procedure for stays has engendered
some controversy. For example, the Eighth Circuit in 2011 entered an
administrative stay of a district court’s ruling preliminarily enjoining
the National Football League from “locking out” players.69 The court
of appeals explained that “[t]he purpose of this administrative stay is
to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the merits of the
motion for a stay pending appeal.”70 However, Judge Bye dissented.71
He argued that the use of a two-step process—first an administrative
stay, then a stay pending appeal—should be limited to “emergencies”
such as capital or immigrant removal cases in which execution or
deportation is imminent; the NFL situation, in his view, did not
qualify.72
Nonetheless, courts have not generally required a situation to be
an “emergency” to warrant an administrative stay. Instead, they have
largely viewed administrative stays as a kind of adjunct to another form
of short-term relief, entered to aid the court in resolving a request for
a stay pending appeal.
2. Temporal Aspect of Administrative Stays
Administrative stays are sometimes called “temporary” stays. To
be sure, stays in general are temporary measures;73 but administrative
65 See Pedro, supra note 21, at 886 n.97. For a few recent examples, see Org. for Black
Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2020); Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154,
160 (5th Cir. 2020); Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121, 130 n.5 (2d Cir. 2020).
66 See, e.g., 8TH CIR. R. 27A(b); see also, e.g., D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES VIII.A (2021); 9TH CIR. GEN. ORD. 6.4(b).
67 E.g., 2D CIR. R. 47.1(c)(2); 6TH CIR. R. 22(c)(3)(B); 9TH CIR. R. 22-2(e).
68 E.g., 4TH CIR. STANDING ORD. 19-01; 9TH CIR. GEN. ORD. 6.4(c)(1).
69 See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2011).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1005–06 (Bye, J., dissenting).
72 Id.
73 The “temporary” label can create terminological confusion. “Administrative stay”
is sometimes used synonymously with “temporary stay.” See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d
1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019). However, “temporary stay” is also used to refer to stays pending
appeal in general. See, e.g., Purkey v. United States, 812 F. App’x 380 (7th Cir. 2020); Veasey
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stays are often rapidly granted, and they last for a shorter period of
time than “regular” stays. For example, in the leadup to the November
2020 election, a federal district court in Texas entered an injunction
requiring Texas officials to adhere to certain procedures for mail-in
voting.74 The Texas Secretary of State appealed on September 9,
2020.75 On September 10, the district court declined to stay its
injunction; on September 11, the Secretary of State filed an
“emergency motion for a stay pending appeal” at the Fifth Circuit.76
The same day, a Fifth Circuit panel granted a “temporary
administrative stay” of the district court’s injunction in order to
consider the Secretary’s stay motion.77 On October 19, the panel
issued an opinion staying the district court’s injunction pending
appeal.78 In this and many other cases,79 courts issue administrative
stays that are in effect for a limited period of time.
Still, it is not clear what period of time counts as “brief” or
“limited.”80 After all, administrative stays have occasionally lasted for
several weeks.81 The “especially temporary” aspect of administrative
stays, then, might be viewed as a contingent feature of the device. The
length of an administrative stay depends on how long courts take to
decide a motion for a stay pending appeal; and courts might be
inclined to take more time if an administrative stay is in place.
3. Relationship to the Traditional Stay Factors
Courts issuing administrative stays do not routinely undertake the
full-fledged four-factor inquiry that the Supreme Court in Nken
enumerated with respect to stays pending appeal—that is, the inquiry
into likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of
the equities, and the public interest (with the first two factors being
most “critical”).82

v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2017); Wolfe v. Clarke, No. 05CV432, 2013 WL
12363382, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2013).
74 Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 2020).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 227–228.
78 Id. at 243.
79 For examples of short-term stays in litigation related to same-sex marriage, see Josh
Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 244, 293–98 (2016).
80 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 92, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) (per curiam) (Nos. 21A244, 21A247) (Chief Justice Roberts inquiring,
with respect to a potential brief administrative stay, “Brief compared to what?”)
81 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
82 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
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In particular, some courts have stressed that an administrative stay
does not reflect any position on the merits of the underlying judgment.
For example, the Supreme Court in February 2019 justified an
administrative stay that had the effect of keeping certain abortion
clinics open by stating that “the filings regarding the application for a
stay in this matter were not completed until earlier today and the
Justices need time to review these filings . . . . This order does not
reflect any view regarding the merits of the petition for a writ of
certiorari that applicants represent they will file.”83 Federal courts of
appeals have on occasion made similar statements.84
The relationship between administrative stays and the merits,
however, is more complicated than may initially meet the eye. In fact,
courts sometimes look at the merits in analyzing administrative stays.
For example, a divided Ninth Circuit panel in 2020 considered the
likelihood of success on the merits in granting the government’s
request for an administrative stay of a district court order regulating
the conduct of federal officers in Portland.85
To take another example, the Fifth Circuit in November 2021
stayed enforcement of an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s COVID-related mandate a day after the agency issued
the mandate, “[b]ecause the petitions give cause to believe there are
grave statutory and constitutional issues with the Mandate.”86 Six days
later, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion that “reaffirm[ed]” its “initial
stay” following “expedited review.”87 The initial stay seemed to have
been an administrative stay: it was entered right after the agency’s
mandate issued and served as a placeholder pending a judicial review
process that resulted in affirmation of the stay. Yet the initial stay

83 June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019).
84 See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019); Cobell v. Norton,
No. 03-5262, 2004 WL 603456, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (per curiam).
85 Order, Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 20-35739, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27408 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2020); see also, e.g., El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d
655, 667 (W.D. Tex. 2019), rev’d in part on other grounds, 982 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2020); Doe
1 v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2017 WL 6553389, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). Courts may
also analyze the likelihood of success on the merits and then deny a “motion for an
administrative stay and a stay pending appeal” in the same breath, see, e.g., Craig v. Simon,
978 F.3d 1043, 1049, 1051 (8th Cir. 2020); Trump v. Vance, 481 F. Supp. 3d 161, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 2020), or deny a “regular” and administrative stay together while disclaiming any
view on the merits, see, e.g., League of Women Voters of S.C. v. Andino, No. 20-2167, 2020
WL 6395498, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 2020). These decisions leave unclear whether any
distinctive analysis applies to administrative stays.
86 BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, No. 21–60845, 2021 WL 5166656, at *1 (5th Cir.
Nov. 6, 2021), aff’d, 17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021).
87 BST Holdings, 17 F.4th at 609.
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appeared to be based on some assessment of the merits of the
underlying mandate.88
Indeed, some judges have argued that courts may not, or should
not, enter an administrative stay without considering the Nken factors,
including likelihood of success on the merits.89 In the view of Ninth
Circuit dissenter Judge Bress, later reiterated in a different dissent by
Ninth Circuit Judge Bumatay, the request for an administrative stay “is
part of the request for a stay pending appeal”; thus, “the usual stay
factors” should apply.90 Along similar lines, a magistrate judge in the
Southern District of New York concluded that “‘an appellate court’s
power to hold an order in abeyance’ pursuant to an administrative stay
‘while it assesses the legality of [an] order’ is constrained by the four
factors that govern the issuance of a stay.’”91 This view has not (yet)
carried the day, but the debate nationwide is not settled.
The notion that administrative stays are a merits-free zone, then,
cannot be taken for granted. On the flip side, courts do not always
emphasize the merits in granting “regular” stays or related orders.
District courts asked to stay their own judgments may emphasize stay
factors other than the likelihood of success on the merits, given that a
court may not wish to “confess to having erred in its ruling before
issuing a stay.”92 In election litigation, courts following the Purcell
principle may stay injunctions against state election laws soon before
an election, without taking a position on the merits of the injunction.93
In a case involving religious objections to a contraception mandate,
the Supreme Court entered an injunction pending appeal while
stating that its “order should not be construed as an expression of the

88 In January 2022, the Supreme Court stayed OSHA’s mandate. See Nat’l Fed’n
Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab. 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022) (per curiam).
89 See Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2019) (Bress, J., dissenting);
see also Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 705 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., dissenting)
(quoting Doe #1, 944 F.3d at 1225).
90 Doe #1, 944 F.3d at 1226; see also Ross, 977 F.3d at 705 n.5 (quoting Doe #1, 944 F.3d
at 1226).
91 N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20 Civ. 3063, 2021 WL 235138,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021) (quoting Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121, 130 n.5 (2d Cir.
2020)) (alteration in original). The district court’s statement may not have accurately
reflected the quoted Second Circuit case, which emphasized that an administrative stay “in
this case issued only to provide time for a motions panel to receive and to decide the
government’s motion for a stay pending appeal” and “cannot be employed to grant a party
effectual relief.” Hassoun, 976 F.3d at 130 n.5.
92 Evans v. Buchanan, 435 F. Supp. 832, 843 (D. Del. 1977); see Meyer v. Kalanick, 203
F. Supp. 3d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
93 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam); Merrill v. Milligan, 142
S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays);
Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 443 (2016).
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Court’s views on the merits.”94 These results might be explained by the
circumstances of litigation involving hot-button issues; judges may wish
to avoid taking a position on the merits but also seek to stave off
disruptive real-world changes. The question remains, however,
whether that kind of approach is consistent with Nken or normatively
desirable.
As to the “critical” stay factor other than likelihood of success on
the merits95—irreparable harm—judicial decisions imposing administrative stays do not typically focus on this factor, at least by name.96 This
may seem surprising, as courts appear to grant administrative stays to
ward off immediate negative consequences. Still, courts imposing
administrative stays tend to cast the aim of avoiding negative
consequences in terms of maintaining the status quo rather than
preventing irreparable harm.97 One possible explanation is practical:
courts considering administrative stays may not have time to delve into
any party’s claims of injury to the extent needed to determine whether
harm is irreparable. Another explanation is more prudential:
administrative stays are designed to be routine and ministerial, and
those features might be undercut if courts were to examine the
potentially contested issue of whether a party had suffered irreparable
injury.
As with likelihood of success on the merits, some judges have
critiqued courts’ apparent reluctance to examine irreparable injury
before issuing an administrative stay.98 Judge Bye of the Eighth Circuit,
for example, argued in dissent that “some showing of irreparable harm
must also be shown to justify the entry of a temporary stay pending
94 Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 959 (2014). For commentary on the Court’s
decision in Wheaton, see Baude, supra note 20, at 15; Hasen, supra note 93, at 435–37;
Richard M. Re, What Standard of Review Did the Court Apply in Wheaton College?, RE’S JUDICATA
(Jul. 5, 2014, 6:42 PM), https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/whatstandard-of-review-did-the-court-apply-in-wheaton-college
[https://perma.cc//8AQSLWJQ].
95 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
96 In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1079, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (no showing of irreparable
harm, but administrative stay would be continued to give government opportunity to seek
relief from Supreme Court). But see In re Red Mountain Mach. Co., 451 B.R. 897, 909
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) (“[E]ven if there were a sufficient showing of likelihood of success
on appeal, it does not justify a stay pending appeal in the absence of any showing of a
likelihood of irreparable injury.”).
97 See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
98 E.g., Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 712 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,

dissenting); Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (Bress, J.,
dissenting); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2011) (Bye,
J., dissenting); see also Order, supra note 85, at 3 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
government has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate either an emergency or
irreparable harm to support an immediate administrative stay. ”).
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review of the motion for a stay,” as a “necessary extension” of the
principle that the stay applicant had to show irreparable harm “to
justify the granting of the stay itself.”99 Justice Sotomayor’s partial
dissent in the S.B. 8 litigation arguing that the Court should have
administratively stayed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment cited “continued
and irreparable harm to women seeking abortion care and providers
of such care in Texas.”100 The Ninth Circuit in 2020 cited irreparable
harm in granting an administrative stay.101 The die may not yet be cast,
then, on whether irreparable harm can be a relevant consideration in
administrative stay determinations.
4. Preserving the Status Quo
If the Nken factors do not consistently apply to administrative stay
determinations, then what is the guidepost for these determinations?
A goal that courts often cite is the need to preserve the status quo.102 On
this account, an administrative stay is a device that courts can use to
preserve the status quo without taking any position on the merits of an
appeal.
Courts have wrestled, however, with what counts as the “status
quo.”103 Litigation involving the 2020 decennial census provides an
example. In August 2020, the Census Bureau moved up a data collection deadline to September 30, 2020 (from October 31, 2020).104 On
September 24, a federal district court in California preliminarily
enjoined the Census Bureau’s schedule change.105 The Trump
administration appealed and sought a stay pending appeal; on
September 30, the Ninth Circuit denied an administrative stay.106 The
court of appeals explained that “the status quo would be seriously
disrupted by an immediate stay of the district court’s order.”107 In the
Ninth Circuit’s view, the district court’s orders—blocking the datacollection scheduling change—“preserve the status quo because they
maintain the [Census] Bureau’s data-collection apparatus pending
Brady, 638 F.3d at 1006.
United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 14, 15 (2021) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101 Order, supra note 85, at 2 (majority order).
102 See, e.g., Ross, 977 F.3d at 702 (majority opinion); Doe #1, 944 F.3d at 1223
(majority opinion).
99
100

103 For discussion in the context of S.B. 8 litigation, see Mark Tushnet, Some Not Very
Focused Preliminary Thoughts About the Shadow Docket (but Leading up to Some Fundamentals
About Constitutional Law), BALKINIZATION (Sept. 10, 2021), https://balkin.blogspot.com
/2021/09/some-not-very-focused-preliminary.html [https://perma.cc/4RS7-KCCV].
104 Ross, 977 F.3d at 700.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 698, 703.
107 Id. at 701.
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resolution of the appeal.”108 Judge Bumatay, in dissent, contended that
“the status quo here, to the extent that’s relevant, is the legal landscape
that would have existed prior to the district court’s judicial
misadventure.”109
Is the status quo, then, the world as it existed before the district
court entered judgment blocking the data-collection scheduling
change? That position would be in harmony with the Supreme Court’s
statement in Nken that a stay pending appeal “suspend[s] judicial
alteration of the status quo.”110 But there are multiple features of the
world preexisting the district court’s judgment that a court might wish
to preserve. The Ninth Circuit majority sought to preserve the Census
Bureau’s data-collection apparatus, which was still mobilized to some
degree before the district court’s judgment.111 Dissenting Judge
Bumatay, by contrast, sought to preserve the “legal landscape” that
would have existed before the district court’s judgment.112 The “legal
landscape” might refer to the Census Bureau’s being under legally
binding orders to meet the earlier data-collection deadline; or it might
refer to the “correct” view of executive authority that the district
court’s order erroneously (in the eyes of Judge Bumatay) contravened.
Another position might be that the status quo is the world as it exists
following the district court’s judgment. In this case, that would be the
world in which the Census Bureau was not legally required to meet the
earlier data-collection deadline.
Different definitions of the status quo would lead to different
results in the administrative stay analysis. In other words, courts that
take the “need to preserve the status quo” as the “touchstone” of an
administrative stay determination113 face the challenge of defining the
status quo.
5. Political Context of Administrative Stays
A final observation regarding the current use of administrative
stays relates to their social and political context. Administrative stays
are not a new phenomenon,114 and they have long been applied in
108
109

Id.
Id. at 712 (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (citing Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1229
(9th Cir. 2019) (Bress, J., dissenting)).
110 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 429 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio
Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regu. Comm’n, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986)
(Scalia, J., in chambers)).
111 See Ross, 977 F.3d at 701.
112 See id. at 712 (Bumatay, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 702 (majority opinion).
114 See, e.g., Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing an
administrative stay).
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certain disputes, such as death penalty and immigration removal
cases.115 However, administrative stays seem to have been discussed
more frequently in recent years, at least in judicially reported
litigation. The trend is visible through, for example, a Westlaw search
of federal court cases for (“administrative stay” /100 “pending
appeal”).116 The search yielded four hits for the first four months of
2022, 23 hits for 2021, 56 for 2020, and 113 for the five years 2017 to
2021. By contrast, the search yielded 43 hits total for the years 1980
through 2016. The largest uptick occurred between 2016 (2 hits) and
2017 (13 hits).
One reason for increased references to administrative stays—in
opinions that appear on Westlaw—may be two situations that gave rise
to a great deal of emergency litigation: the November 2020 election
and COVID-19. At least 12 of the relevant cases for 2020 were related
to the election.117 Yet the references to administrative stays in these
contexts appears to be part of a broader trend since 2017, involving
litigation against Trump administration policies in a variety of areas,
including immigration, the census, and constitutional rights.
Commentators have pointed both to nationwide injunctions and an
administration more likely to seek stays of lower-court opinions as
reasons for litigation seeking emergency relief.118
The upshot is that administrative stays seem to be sought and
granted more frequently in politically salient litigation, especially
lawsuits against government actors who wish to alter policy in
significant ways. Although courts have not yet engaged in much
discussion of the standards for issuing administrative stays, the few
opinions addressing the matter—primarily from the Fifth and Ninth

115 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
116 I last carried out this search on May 24, 2022. These search terms are meant to
weed out administrative stays that do not fit into the mold of stays issued by courts to provide
time to consider a motion for a stay of injunctive relief. For example, the search terms are
aimed at excluding stays that agencies enter.
117 See League of Women Voters of S.C. v. Andino, No. 20-2167, 2020 WL 6395498 (4th
Cir. Oct. 29, 2020); Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, No. 20-50907, 2020 WL 6334374 (5th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2020) (per curiam); Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2020);
Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020); Tex. League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 2020); A. Philip Randolph Inst. of Ohio v.
Larose, 831 F. App’x 188 (6th Cir. 2020); Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir.
2020); Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2020); Miller v. Thurston,
967 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2020); Craig v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 2020); Mi Familia Vota
v. Hobbs, 977 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2020); Common Sense Party v. Padilla, 469 F. Supp. 3d 951
(E.D. Cal. 2020).
118 Vladeck, supra note 20, at 132–52. Vladeck suggests that nationwide injunctions
should not be viewed as the “principal” cause of the uptick in applications for emergency
relief. See id. at 153–55.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

1960

[VOL. 97:5

Circuits—have emerged largely in the last few years.119 Perhaps there
is an increasing amount of litigation engendering controversy about
whether to put government action on hold even for a brief period.
The elevated judicial attention to administrative stays suggests that it
will be useful to engage in further discussion of the appropriate
standard for employing this device.
II.

AUTHORITY TO ISSUE ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS

This Part examines the legal bases for administrative stays. First,
the Part identifies the All Writs Act and courts’ inherent docketmanagement powers as grounds for courts to issue administrative stays.
Second, it analyzes the relationship between administrative stays and
the federal equity power.
A. Legal Bases for Administrative Stays
There are two main sources of authority for federal courts to grant
administrative stays: (1) the powers either conferred by, or preserved
in, the All Writs Act, and (2) federal courts’ inherent power to manage
their dockets. This Section describes these sources of authority; the
next Section considers the relationship between these sources of
authority and equitable powers.
1. The All Writs Act
The All Writs Act, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,120
authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.”121 The Supreme Court explained in Nken that the
All Writs Act “preserve[s]” “[a]n appellate court’s power to hold an
order in abeyance while it assesses the legality of the order.”122 The
Supreme Court’s language of “preservation” might suggest that the All
Writs Act confirmed—rather than granted—federal courts’ power to
issue stays. On this account, the “judicial Power of the United States”
that Article III of the Constitution vests in federal courts123
incorporates the preexisting power to issue stays.

119 See, e.g., In re Abbott (Abbott III), 800 F. App’x 296 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam);
Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2019).
120 See All Writs Act, ch. 231, §§ 234, 261–62, 36 Stat. 1156, 1156, 1162 (1911) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018)); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–
82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018)).
121 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018).
122 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009).
123 U.S. CONST. art. III.
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The Nken decision did not specifically mention administrative
stays, and it is not clear whether the Nken Court’s reference to the
“power to hold an order in abeyance while it assesses the legality of the
order” encompasses the power to grant administrative stays.124 Thus,
Nken does not directly identify the legal basis for federal courts to issue
administrative stays. There are nonetheless strong reasons, some of
them related to the Court’s analysis in Nken, to read the All Writs Act
to authorize courts to grant administrative stays. An administrative stay
may be “necessary . . . in aid of” a court’s “jurisdiction[]”125 in the
sense that denying an administrative stay could moot an appeal—for
example, in a capital case.126 Even if an administrative stay is not
essential to preserve jurisdiction, the All Writs Act authorizes courts to
issue writs “appropriate in aid of . . . jurisdictio[n].”127
An
administrative stay is a kind of adjunct to a stay pending appeal; it
allows courts to offer temporary relief while the stay decision is being
made. In fact, an administrative stay (as noted below) may greatly
influence a party’s ability to benefit from a stay pending appeal.128
Therefore, an administrative stay is an “appropriate” mechanism to
“aid” federal courts in exercising their jurisdiction to issue a stay
pending appeal.
Is an administrative stay “agreeable to the usages and principles
of law” within the meaning of the All Writs Act?129 The Supreme Court
in 1901, upholding an appellate court’s stay, explained that “[t]ested
by the principles and rules which relate to chancery proceedings, the
power of the appellate court to render its jurisdiction efficacious, the
court below refusing to do so, is unquestionable.”130 An administrative
stay, as just observed, can be a mechanism to render the jurisdiction of
the appellate court efficacious. Further, the Court in a 1942 case
described stays of “the enforcement of a judgment pending the
outcome of an appeal” as part of a court’s “traditional equipment for

124 Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. An administrative stay holds an order in abeyance while the
court decides whether to grant a different form of emergency relief. Does that decisionmaking process involve “assessing the legality” of the judgment under review? If not, then
administrative stays might not be covered by Nken. But it may not be advisable to read too
much into the language of Nken; the Supreme Court has cautioned, after all, that “the
language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language
of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979).
125 Nken, 556 U.S. at 426.
126 See Pedro, supra note 21, at 874 (“[T]he primary purpose of granting a stay pending
appellate review is to ensure a meaningful opportunity to appeal.”).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
128 See infra subsection III.C.2.
129 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
130 In re McKenzie, 180 U.S. 536, 551 (1901).
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the administration of justice.”131 An administrative stay is not, strictly
speaking, entered “pending the outcome of an appeal.” But it is
entered to provide time for a court to decide whether to issue a stay
pending the outcome of an appeal, and so it bears sufficient
resemblance to a stay pending appeal to be “agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.” All in all, administrative stays plausibly fall
within the ambit of the All Writs Act.
2. Inherent Docket-Management Power
Another source of the power to issue an administrative stay is
federal courts’ inherent authority to manage their dockets. This
source of authority may not be entirely separate from the All Writs Act,
as that Act could be understood to preserve courts’ preexisting docketmanagement powers. Moreover, the fact that a court has inherent
authority to control its own docket could help explain why an
administrative stay is “agreeable to the usages and principles of law”132
within the meaning of the All Writs Act. Whether the docketmanagement power stands on its own or is to be read in conjunction
with the All Writs Act, courts issuing administrative stays can draw on
their inherent docket-management authority.
“[T]he power to stay proceedings,” the Supreme Court stated in
the 1936 case Landis v. North American Co., “is incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.”133 True, the statement from Landis relates to a court’s power
to stay proceedings, as when a court puts a hold on discovery, rather than
the power to stay a judgment that it issued or the judgment of another
court. But the Nken Court—which dealt with a motion to stay another
court’s judgment—cited Landis in describing the burden on a party
seeking a stay.134 More generally, the rationales that courts use to
explain their inherent powers to control their dockets apply to
administrative stays. The Supreme Court has indicated, for instance,
that “‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts
of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise
of all others.’”135 These powers include authority to admit attorneys,
131 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942).
132 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
133 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
134 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
135 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)); see also United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct.
1024 (2022) (Barrett, J., concurring) (“Article III’s grant of ‘[t]he judicial Power’ imbues
each federal court with the inherent authority to regulate its own proceedings.” (alteration
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impose contempt sanctions, mandate decorum, and vacate a court’s
own judgment in cases of fraud.136 The Court has also explained
inherent powers by referencing the “control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.”137
The power to issue an administrative stay is part of a court’s ability
to manage its affairs to dispose of cases in an orderly manner.
Administrative stays may not be necessary to the exercise of all judicial
powers, but they operate as a meaningful adjunct to the power to issue
a stay pending appeal. Administrative stays enable courts considering
whether to grant stays pending appeal to take more time to analyze the
Nken factors without permitting practical consequences the court
deems unwarranted or unacceptable. The result is likely to be a more
regimented process for examining the likelihood of success on the
merits and irreparable harm, both factors that engender substantial
difficulty and controversy. Administrative stays, then, are part of the
procedures that courts use to structure their internal affairs to advance
the orderly and effective administration of justice.138
Accordingly, the authority to issue administrative stays can be
grounded in both federal courts’ powers under the All Writs Act and
their inherent power to manage their dockets. When it comes to the
Supreme Court’s power to impose an administrative stay, an additional
source of authority is 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). That provision, as earlier
noted, provides for justices to stay a judgment subject to review by the
Supreme Court “for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to
obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.”139 An
administrative stay reasonably falls within this grant of power. As to a
stay beyond the period of a certiorari petition—that is, a stay pending
resolution of the merits of a case—the Supreme Court would be

in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of
the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 338 (2006) (“[I]t is generally recognized that
Article III vests every federal court with some degree of ‘inherent authority’ to regulate
procedure by adjudication.”).
136 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–44. For further discussion of “inherent judicial authority,”
see, for example, Charles M. Yablon, Inherent Judicial Authority: A Study in Creative Ambiguity,
43 CARDOZO L. REV. 1035 (2022).
137 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962).
138 For discussions of federal courts’ exercises of “managerial” or administrative
authority, see, for example, Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 53–63 (2015); Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a
Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
139 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f); see supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
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covered by the All Writs Act and would possess its own docketmanagement power.
A final point relating to federal courts’ authority to grant
administrative stays: administrative stays of judicial orders granting
injunctions could be conceived as modifications to the injunction.140
In that event, an administrative stay would operate on the injunction
by delaying its effective date. This way of thinking about administrative
stays could have the effect of downplaying merits considerations, as the
administrative stay order would change the timing of the injunction
rather than its substance. Of course, delaying an injunction could have
significant consequences on the ground.
But the notion of
downplaying the merits is compatible with the proposal for
administrative stays proposed below.141
B. Administrative Stays and Federal Equity Power
What is the relationship between administrative stays and federal
equity power? At the outset, stays in general do not have an entirely
straightforward relationship with equity. On the one hand, as Samuel
Bray has observed, “[a] stay pending judicial review is not exactly an
equitable remedy, being neither traditionally limited to equity nor a
remedy even in the broad sense of what ‘the court can do for you if you
win’ or what it ‘can do to you if you lose.’”142 After all, courts can issue
stays in suits seeking both damages and injunctions.143
On the other hand, as Bray has also noted, stays are
“conventionally treated alongside the preliminary injunction,” and
“injunctions and stays have affected each other’s doctrinal
development.”144 Judges exercising equitable authority frequently
consider irreparable harm,145 and they are often afforded a measure of
discretion to achieve a more equitable outcome.146 Stays share these
characteristics. Although the Supreme Court in Nken rejected the view
that a stay was a form of injunction within the meaning of the relevant
immigration statute, the Court acknowledged that “[a] stay pending
appeal certainly has some functional overlap with an injunction,

140 I thank Sam Bray for this suggestion.
141 See infra Section III.C.
142 Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1033
n.203 (2015) (quoting Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV.
LITIG. 161, 165 (2008)).
143 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).
144 Bray, supra note 142, at 1033 n.203; see also, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573,
584 (2006) (“[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy.”).
145 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
146 Id. at 433.
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particularly a preliminary one.”147 James Fischer puts the point this
way: stays are “not an equitable remedy per se,” but they are “a form
of extraordinary relief that are often discussed in terms that mirror the
providing of temporary equitable relief.”148
On the whole, stays invite judges to make determinations that are
typical of courts exercising equitable power. The question whether
administrative stays are also exercises of equitable power depends at
least partially on the nature of the inquiry that courts undertake in
issuing administrative stays. To the extent courts weigh the equities or
balance harms in deciding whether to issue an administrative stay, they
engage in activities that are characteristic of equity.
The idea that equitable power undergirds administrative stays is
not an alternative to the view that the All Writs Act or inherent docketmanagement authority provides a basis for federal courts to issue
administrative stays. The All Writs Act itself is reasonably read to
confer equitable power on federal courts or to confirm preexisting
equitable powers.149 Federal courts’ inherent power to manage their
own proceedings may also emanate from equitable authority. As
Robert Pushaw has observed, “Federal courts have long asserted
equitable power to manage their affairs to ensure the orderly,
expeditious, and efficient administration of justice.”150
Thus,
administrative stays could constitute exercises of equitable power if the
authority to grant such stays is grounded in the All Writs Act or in
federal courts’ inherent docket-management powers.
To the extent administrative stays are instances in which federal
courts employ their equitable authority, they may be subject to
principles applicable to federal courts’ exercise of equitable powers
more generally. For instance, if one views equity as a “safety valve” for

147 Id. at 428. Justice Alito, in dissent, adduced numerous instances in which courts
have referred to “stay” orders as “injunctions.” Id. at 442–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
148 JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 259 (2006).
149 See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 537 (1999) (“The All Writs Act invests
a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide
alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law.” (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S.
416, 429 (1996)).
150 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 760 (2001); see also Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Inherent and
Supervisory Power, 54 GA. L. REV. 411, 431 (2020) (“In its modern form, then, the inherent
power of courts to exercise control over litigants is partly ‘rooted in the notion that a federal
court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court . . .
to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.’”) (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp.
v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978)). But see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 46 (1991) (“The imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a court’s equitable
power concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to
police itself . . . .”).
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the unfairness that would result in its absence,151 then administrative
stays should issue when they serve the “safety valve” role. Another
possibility, and an influential one, is to view equity as historically
bounded. The Supreme Court has stated that “[s]ubstantially, . . . the
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity
exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original
Judiciary Act, 1789.”152 On this account, the authority to grant
equitable remedies is limited by history. This raises the question
whether administrative stays are compatible with historical equity
jurisdiction and whether, if so, history furnishes standards for courts to
apply in adjudicating requests for administrative stays.
I have not yet encountered much evidence of a distinctive
historical approach toward administrative stays (or functionally similar
orders), as opposed to stays in general. The Supreme Court has
highlighted the solid historical foundation of stays in general;
according to Nken, “[t]he power to grant a stay pending review” is “part
of a court’s ‘traditional equipment for the administration of
justice,’ . . . ‘firmly imbedded in our judicial system,’ ‘consonant with
the historic procedures of federal appellate courts,’ and ‘a power as
old as the judicial system of the nation.’”153 Moreover, the category of
internal docket-management powers—to which the authority to grant
administrative stays plausibly belongs—has a strong historical pedigree.154 But it is not clear that historical practice furnishes specific
standards for courts to follow in adjudicating administrative stay
requests, though further research on this topic would be fruitful.
With respect to stays in general, Jill Wieber Lens has argued that
historical practice, including English equity practice, provides little
basis for courts to consider the merits of an appeal when evaluating a

151 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050, 1080 (2021); see
also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (referring to “[t]he great
principles of equity” as “securing complete justice”) (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)).
152 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999) (quoting ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE 660 (1928)). For critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s view, see, for example,
Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal
Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1297–33 (2000); Judith Resnik,
Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223,
234–49 (2003); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV.
920, 1003 (2020).
153 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–10, 13, 17 (1942)).
154 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
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stay request.155 In Lens’s view, English and early American courts
emphasized irreparable harm and only sporadically considered the
merits in making stay determinations.156 According to Lens, the merits
became a significant factor in stay determinations only as a
consequence of a 1958 D.C. Circuit case.157 If one agrees with Lens
and also takes a historical approach toward federal equitable power,
the logical conclusion is that Nken—which deems the likelihood of
success one of the “most critical” factors in a stay determination—rests
on shaky ground. In terms of the consequences for administrative
stays, one might take the view that courts making these determinations
should not consider the merits. Such a conclusion would be largely
consistent with the analysis of administrative stays offered below,158
which downplays merits considerations.
This Article does not seek to resolve the debate over the role of
history in federal equity. It does not adopt a purely historical approach
in the sense of searching for close historical analogues to
administrative stays and identifying the standards that courts used in
those instances. Instead, the approach to administrative stays outlined
in the next Part draws on fundamental interests that ought to underlie
courts’ determinations in fast-moving litigation, including
deliberation, consistency, and efficiency. Considering these interests
could be compatible with a historical view of federal equity at least at a
high level.159 Historical practice may support the use of federal courts’
inherent powers “so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases”; and “orderly and expeditious disposition” is
consistent with interests such as deliberation, consistency, and
efficiency.160 Moreover, one reason to turn to historical practice could
be to constrain federal courts in exercising equitable power.161 Yet
interests such as deliberation, consistency, and efficiency can also help
to direct judicial discretion, even if not to the same extent as an inquiry
into precise historical analogues. Overall, the Article’s approach to
155 See Lens, supra note 21, at 1329–36.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1335 (citing Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
158 See infra Section III.C.
159 The debate over how broadly to interpret the notion of federal courts’ historical
equity powers figured in the back-and-forth between the majority and dissent in Grupo
Mexicano. Compare Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999), with id. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
161 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322 (“We do not question the proposition that
equity is flexible; but in the federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the
broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.”).
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administrative stays is not guided by the search for close historical
analogues, but it reflects some concerns that may be associated with a
historically grounded understanding of federal equity.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS: A PROPOSAL

How, then, should courts approach administrative stays? This Part
first identifies interests that courts should aim to advance. The Part
then analyzes options for administrative stay standards in terms of how
effectively they promote these interests. The Part ultimately endorses
one of these options, but the broader goal is to encourage debate
about how courts should address requests for administrative stays.
A. Interests to Guide Administrative Stay Determinations
Here are some interests to guide administrative stay determinations. They are distilled from values that courts and commentators
often describe as significant in time-pressured litigation and in civil
procedure more generally.
1. Deliberation. This is the interest in creating and fostering the
conditions conducive to judges’ thoughtful consideration of cases.
Deliberation is valuable because it may produce results that are more
legally sound, in the sense that they conform more closely to the
applicable legal framework. Deliberation is also valuable because it
gives parties and the public the sense that cases are taken seriously.162
2. Efficiency. Efficiency is an important value in litigation, as
suggested by the instruction in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that the rules “should be construed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”163 Time
is frequently of the essence in litigation in which parties seek administrative stays, and a court’s ability to decide motions expeditiously can
have an outsized impact in these settings.
3. Consistency. This is the interest in “treating like cases alike”—
in granting administrative stays when they have been granted in similar
situations, and in denying administrative stays when they have been
denied in similar situations. Consistency has several positive effects,
including impartiality (judges should grant or deny administrative
stays without respect to their sympathy for the parties) and
predictability (parties and the public should be able to predict, at least
roughly, when courts are likely to grant administrative stays).

162 For discussion of the importance of process in influencing citizens’ views of the law,
see, for example, Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003).
163 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

2022]

ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS: POWER AND PROCEDURE

1969

4. Legitimacy. This is the interest in maintaining public trust that
judges are judging fairly. The extent to which judges should act with
a view toward public perception is a subject of controversy.164 I refer
here to legitimacy that arises not from public agreement with
substantive legal outcomes, but with public views as to the fairness and
impartiality of the process that judges used to reach their conclusions.
In practice, public agreement with substantive legal outcomes and
public views regarding procedural fairness may overlap; but, on the
account presented here, it is the latter that primarily ought to be
valued.
5. Reason-giving. Reason-giving is frequently cited as a significant
value in litigation,165 and with justification. The process of producing
reasons may lead to more legally sound outcomes, as judges must
confront the broader impact of their rulings and deal with
counterarguments. Reason-giving may also assure parties and the
public that cases are being judged in an attentive and just way.
6. The “passive virtues.” When judges exercise the “passive
virtues,”166 they avoid issuing bold rulings on the merits of a legal
question in favor of narrower or less interventionist forms of judging.
Judges may exercise these virtues by applying such doctrines as
standing, ripeness, and political questions.167 The aim of applying the
passive virtues could be to avoid instigating social conflict or to
encourage “percolation” of legal issues before a higher court needs to
step in. The merits of the passive virtues may, of course, be debated.
Administrative stays are an area in which the passive virtues are
particularly useful, given that judges do not have much time to
consider the long-term consequences of their rulings.
The interests just mentioned are not the only possible ones, and
they may be in tension with one another in certain circumstances. But
they provide guideposts against which various approaches to
administrative stays can be measured.
B. Options for Administrative Stays
This Section evaluates various approaches to administrative stays
with respect to their propensity to promote various interests discussed
164 For discussion of the value of various types of judicial legitimacy, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); Tara Leigh Grove,
The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)).
165 See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L.J. 612, 620 (2020); Robin
J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683 (2014).
166 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
167 See id. at 43, 47.
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above. For current purposes, administrative stays can be defined as
court orders temporarily preventing a judgment from being carried
out while the court resolves a motion for another form of emergency
relief, often a stay pending appeal. The current Section considers (and
ultimately rejects) three potential approaches; the next Section
presents this Article’s proposal for administrative stay standards.
1. No administrative stays. One possibility is not to permit any
administrative stays. Federal courts could still issue stays in the sense
of orders temporarily blocking a judgment from taking effect.
However, these stays would require a full analysis of the Nken factors,
including likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.168
This option would have the advantage of promoting consistency;
courts would apply the uniform rule of no administrative stays. But
this option would be detrimental in terms of deliberation. It might
induce judges to resolve stay motions in a more compressed period,
because they could not rely on an “administrative stay” to prevent the
judgment under review from being carried out. The result would be
less considered decision-making concerning the Nken factors,
including the likelihood of success on the merits. And judges might
be reluctant later to depart from their initial views of the merits even
if they are not formally bound by these views.169 Similar difficulties
might result if courts issue orders that are called “administrative stays”
but that are subject to the same Nken factors applicable to “regular”
stays. In that event, parties might begin to request “administrative stays
of administrative stays,” and a problem of recursion would arise.
2. Administrative stays in every case. At the opposite pole, courts
could enter an administrative stay whenever they are considering a
motion for a stay pending appeal. This option would be valuable from
a consistency perspective. It could also advance deliberation and
reason-giving in some cases: judges who are content with the situation
prevailing during the administrative stay could take more time to
decide whether to grant a stay pending appeal and to justify their views.
Administrative stays do not, however, simply “buy time” with no cost;
they can significantly change facts on the ground. In the Ninth Circuit
census case discussed earlier, an administrative stay could have made
the difference between winding down or continuing census

168 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435–36 (2009).
169 See McFadden & Kapoor, supra note 20, at 876 (“[W]hile it is true that the Justices
themselves are not bound by their preliminary views on a case, a decision to grant a stay is
at least . . . a signal of their views.”); Richard M. Re, Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court,
136 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4068518 (“Justices view their own past rulings as evidence of how
they should rule today, and they also have strong incentives to remain personally
consistent.”).
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operations, with a potentially large impact on government decisions
about funding and political representation.170 A rigid “administrative
stay in every case” rule would not permit courts to consider whether
such consequences were warranted. This kind of inflexibility could
well harm legitimacy and would not be consonant with the “passive
virtues.”
In addition, there are efficiency costs to granting administrative
stays in every case. Parties would be incentivized to seek stays pending
appeal, no matter how meritless; and courts might take more time to
resolve requests for stays pending appeal. There would also be a shift
with respect to the power of district courts and the finality of their
judgments, as district court judgments would not take effect until any
motion for a stay pending appeal were resolved.
3. Administrative stays for certain types of plaintiffs or legal claims. A
third option would be to reserve administrative stays for certain types
of cases, that is, those involving specific kinds of plaintiffs or legal
claims. For instance, district court judgments ruling against the
exercise of constitutional rights might be administratively stayed
pending appeal.171 Such an approach, however, would seem arbitrary
unless it were connected to a more general framework explaining the
differential treatment of certain disputes or rights. As explained
below, it is reasonable to suggest that specific types of cases be treated
in procedurally distinct ways at the administrative stay stage.172 In
particular, automatic administrative stays could be essential in death
penalty cases to preserve the court’s ability to rule on an inmate’s
appeal.173 But the interest in preserving that ability should be
considered as part of a broader analysis of the effects of an
administrative stay determination. The next Section presents a
proposal that endorses such a broader analysis.

170 Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2020). After the 2020
census results were tabulated, New York lost a seat in the House of Representatives after
coming up 89 residents short. Shane Goldmacher, New York Loses House Seat After Coming
Up 89 People Short on Census, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021
/04/26/nyregion/new-york-census-congress.html [https://perma.cc/U43D-L9M9].
171 Such an approach would be reminiscent of the view that “[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)).
172 See infra subsection III.C.1.
173 For discussion of the value of preserving a “meaningful opportunity to appeal,” see
Pedro, supra note 21, at 909; see also infra subsection III.C.2.
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C. Proposed Standards for Administrative Stays
This Section presents the Article’s proposal for procedures and
standards to govern administrative stays. As an initial matter, there are
several avenues for courts and other legal actors to promulgate
standards for administrative stays. One is by congressional statute;
Congress has previously set out subject-specific standards for courts to
apply in issuing stays.174 Another is court rules—either court rules
applying across the federal judicial system, such as the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, or rules adopted by individual courts to
govern their proceedings.175 Systemwide court rules, as distinct from
circuit-specific judicial opinions or rules, promote uniformity and
reduce the kind of forum shopping that has been criticized in the
context of nationwide injunctions.176 Beyond court rules, judges in
their opinions could weigh in on the standards for administrative stays.
Recent Ninth Circuit opinions have undertaken this task to some
extent,177 and further percolation on the issue would be beneficial.
However standards for administrative stays are promulgated, the
promulgating body should take into account both procedural and
substantive features of administrative stay determinations.
1. Procedural features.
Certain procedural features of administrative stays would help to
advance the interests discussed above.
First, administrative stays should be granted for a limited time
frame, and courts ought to set a highly expedited briefing schedule for
the stay pending appeal at the same time as they issue an administrative
stay. These practices would advance consistency and legitimacy, as
courts would not implement greatly divergent schedules for
administrative stays in different contexts and would thus invite fewer
charges of partiality. To the extent rulemaking bodies are creating
rules to govern administrative stays, they may wish to consider setting
a presumptive time limit for these stays (say, five business days), subject
174 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (authorizing automatic stay in bankruptcy); Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424 (2009) (describing a past statute providing for automatic stay of
removal order while judicial review was pending).
175 For discussion of court rules that currently govern issuance of stays, see supra notes
35–40 and accompanying text.
176 For discussion of forum-shopping and nationwide injunctions, see, for example,
Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417,
457–61 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1104–06 (2018); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2143
(2017).
177 See Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 700–01 (9th Cir. 2020); Doe #1 v.
Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019).
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to alteration if a particular motion for a stay pending appeal requires
especially intensive deliberation. Another option would be to set an
inflexible time limit for administrative stays, and to permit parties to
reapply for an administrative stay after the time expires. Either way,
issuing an order with a set time frame for the administrative stay helps
to send the message that the stay is a regularized part of judicial
practice.178 The message that courts operate according to orderly and
consistent procedures is conducive to public trust in the judicial
system.
Second, courts need not write detailed opinions justifying their
decisions to grant or deny administrative stays. Indeed, judges should
be discouraged from doing so. Here the interests in reason-giving and
the “passive virtues” are in tension. On the one hand, the parties and
the public have an interest in understanding the basis for courts’
decisions. On the other hand, an overly detailed explanation can
cause judges to make more law. Judges may take legal positions at the
administrative stay stage that they may later feel pressure to sustain,
and other courts may treat administrative stay pronouncements as
precedential to some extent.179 In other words, extensive reasoning
provided within a short time frame runs the risk of creating overbroad
or detrimental guidance. This is not to say judges need to be silent in
granting or denying administrative stays. Judges could indicate the
considerations on which their decisions rest in a couple of sentences—
perhaps one sentence to cover the appellant’s ability to benefit from a
stay pending appeal, and one sentence to cover the appellee’s ability
to benefit from the district court’s judgment. The court could then
provide a more extensive analysis at the stage of the “regular” stay
pending appeal.
Third, for certain categories of cases, it makes sense for court rules
to provide for imposition of an automatic administrative stay, with no
need for judges to consider each case individually. This approach may
be suitable for death penalty and deportation cases, in which failing to
enter a stay could well undercut the possibility of a practically effective
appeal (as discussed further below).180 The main rationale behind this
suggestion is efficiency. If it is highly likely that an administrative stay
should be granted, the court would be better off implementing that
result without individualized judicial consideration, unless a party
brings an extraordinary circumstance to the court’s attention.

178 For discussion of the role of remedies in expressing messages, see, for example,
Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies and Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial Relief, 109 GEO.
L.J. 1263, 1305–11 (2021).
179 See supra note 20.
180 See infra subsection III.C.2.
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Fourth, in non-capital or deportation cases, courts should
ordinarily impose an administrative stay only when the party seeking
to appeal asks for such relief.181 Administrative stays delay the
effectiveness of district court rulings, and courts should not generally
incur that cost when a party has not even requested a stay. To be sure,
the judges themselves may wish to take more time to decide the
“regular” stay motion, independent of the parties’ requests. As earlier
noted, however, an administrative stay does not merely “buy time”; it
temporarily nullifies the effect of another court’s judgment in a way
that may have substantial real-world impact. Courts should not
generally take this step when a party has not even requested it (unless,
perhaps, not granting an administrative stay would have drastic and
uncontroversially negative results).
2. Substantive standards.
Here are substantive standards that courts could apply to
administrative stays to further the interests in deliberation, efficiency,
consistency, legitimacy, reason-giving, and the passive virtues.
First, courts should try to separate administrative stays from the
merits as much as possible. Doing so would advance deliberation, as
judges would not be faced with the pressure to make a decision about
the likelihood of success on the merits in a highly compressed time
frame.
Nonetheless, courts could appropriately decline to grant an
administrative stay if they determined on the basis of the materials
before them that the appeal is frivolous, in the sense that “the result is
obvious or the appellant’s arguments are wholly without merit.”182 To
gauge frivolousness, courts could draw on the body of law interpreting
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 (on frivolous appeals)183 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (on frivolous litigation). 184 An
appeal may be frivolous even if the case, as originally filed, was not; for
example, the lower court’s factfinding may be unassailable on a
deferential appellate standard of review. Still, “nonfrivolous” is a low
bar. It functions to weed out clearly meritless requests for
administrative stays without requiring courts to opine in any substantial
way on the merits. Reducing merits analysis will help to convey to
181 See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (Courts generally
“rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present.” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States 554 U.S. 237,
243 (2008))).
182 Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989)).
183 FED. R. APP. P. 38.
184 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
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parties and the public that the court is not hastily deciding a
contentious issue, thereby bolstering legitimacy.
Second, courts should consider the impact of granting or denying
an administrative stay on the parties. In particular, courts ought to
weigh (a) the extent to which denying an administrative stay would
limit an applicant’s ability to benefit from a stay pending appeal,
should the court ultimately choose to grant it, against (b) the extent
to which granting an administrative stay would limit the opposing
party’s ability to benefit from the judgment under review, should the
court ultimately choose to uphold it. The thrust of the proposal is to
focus attention on the specific effects of the administrative stay
determination during pendency of the motion for a stay pending
appeal. This approach is in keeping with the view that administrative
stays are adjuncts to stays pending appeal.
To elaborate, one side of the balance involves the degree to which
denying an administrative stay would diminish the stay applicant’s
ability to secure the benefits of a stay pending appeal. Portia Pedro
has suggested that “preserving the opportunity for a meaningful
appeal” is a critical feature of stays in general.185 In the context of
administrative stays, the question would be whether an administrative
stay is needed to ensure that the stay applicant remains able to secure
the benefits that a “regular” stay pending appeal would provide.
Capital cases present the clearest instances in which denial of an
administrative stay would eliminate the stay applicant’s ability to gain
the benefits of a stay pending appeal; if an administrative stay were
denied, the inmate would presumably be executed. Immigrationremoval cases furnish another such instance; if an administrative stay
were denied and the immigrant removed from the country, it might
be quite difficult to bring the person back (and, in the case of certain
immigrants, to bring the person back unharmed). But there are other
examples as well. Say a city seizes private property on the basis that
activities on the property will result in the illegal release of highly toxic
chemicals. A district court enters judgment enjoining the seizure as a
due process violation. The city seeks to appeal; it also seeks a stay of
the district court’s judgment pending appeal and an administrative
stay. To the extent the city can demonstrate that denial of an
administrative stay would likely result in the immediate release of toxic
chemicals, the city’s interest in preserving the ability to benefit from a
stay pending appeal weighs in favor of an administrative stay.
The interests of the stay applicant, however, are not the only ones
that courts should take into consideration. The party that secured a
ruling in its favor (the “prevailing party”) has an important interest in
185

See Pedro, supra note 21, at 903.
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being able to maintain the benefit of that ruling. In deciding whether
to issue an administrative stay, therefore, courts should take into
account the extent to which the administrative stay would undercut the
prevailing party’s capacity to derive benefit from the ruling in its favor.
For example, say an agency issues a regulation requiring changes
in the design of polluting products. The district court holds the regulation invalid; the agency appeals and seeks a stay pending appeal, in
addition to an administrative stay. The manufacturers challenging the
agency decision oppose an administrative stay on the ground that
delaying production any longer would force them to restructure their
operations substantially. Such a showing by the manufacturers should
cut against an administrative stay, because the manufacturers’ ability
to benefit from the district-court ruling in their favor would be
significantly reduced were an administrative stay granted.
There will be intermediate cases; for example, administratively
staying a district court’s ruling greenlighting a new immigration policy
may affect the government’s ability to carry out its immigration
procedures with respect to a certain group of immigrants but would
not eliminate this ability in perpetuity. But benefit to the prevailing
party is a consideration for courts evaluating requests for administrative stays to take into account.
The harm-weighing analysis just described is meant to create
greater consistency while preserving courts’ flexibility to consider a
range of consequences. Focusing attention on the impact of an
administrative stay on the parties’ ability to benefit from a “regular”
stay or from the judgment below is designed to advance a more
regularized examination than currently exists. Nonetheless, courts can
exercise a degree of discretion within those parameters.
The proposed approach would also help to facilitate judicial
deliberation on the case. Denial of an administrative stay could restrict
deliberation if it undermines the meaningfulness of a “regular” stay or
the appeal more generally; that prospect would count in favor of
granting an administrative stay in the harm-weighing analysis. With
respect to efficiency, the harm-weighing analysis consumes judicial
resources, but not to the same extent as a full-blown inquiry into
likelihood of success on the merits.
The balancing task would not be a mechanical endeavor. It is
certainly possible for merits-driven reasoning to creep in, posing
potential difficulties in terms of legitimacy. At the same time, the
proposed approach seeks to constrain courts by focusing attention on
marginal effects on the parties for the specific period of the
administrative stay. Such constraint would be useful in terms of
promoting legitimacy, as well as the passive virtues.
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The proposal advanced here does not explicitly invoke three
doctrinal concepts that are often incorporated into administrative or
“regular” stay determinations—namely, the status quo, irreparable
harm, and the public interest. The principles underlying these
doctrinal concepts are likely to figure into the proposed analysis of the
harms that each party stands to incur should an administrative stay be
granted or denied. Nonetheless, the proposal does not treat the status
quo, irreparable harm, or the public interest in terms of boxes that
courts must check off before granting or denying an administrative
stay.
To elaborate: take first the status quo. This is an elusive concept
that could refer to the world as it existed before the district court
entered judgment (either the empirical “facts on the ground” or the
“legal landscape”), or the world as it existed following the district
court’s judgment.186 If courts defined the status quo on a case-by-case
basis, they would create inconsistency and undercut legitimacy. Courts
could apply one definition across the board, but they would jeopardize
appropriate contextual sensitivity. For example, courts might decide
to grant administrative stays to restore the “facts on the ground” prior
to the district court judgment. But the effect of restoring those facts
would depend on the speed with which the defendant happened to
implement the action challenged in the litigation. If the defendant
swiftly effectuated the challenged actions prior to the district court’s
judgment, the “facts on the ground” would favor the defendant. It is
not clear why the administrative stay determination should hinge on
the defendant’s alacrity. More generally, underlying the interest in
preserving the status quo seem to be concerns about the harms that
each party would incur with or without an administrative stay. It would
be more advisable for courts to confront these harms directly, instead
of relying on the idea of the status quo.
A related point applies to the concept of irreparable harm, one of
the traditional stay factors.187 On the one hand, the idea of irreparable
harm has intuitive purchase in administrative stay determinations. If
the harm could be fully redressed after the fact, then the need for an
administrative stay would be less acute. On the other hand, binary
judgments about whether harm is reparable or irreparable are not
straightforward or value-free determinations. A great many harms
cannot literally be repaired.188 As Douglas Laycock has argued, courts
applying the “irreparable injury” rule weigh various costs and benefits
of imposing injunctive relief, including factors related to interference
186 See supra subsection I.B.4.
187 See supra subsections I.B.3.
188 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917, 961 (2010).
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with the authority of another tribunal, the practicability of supervising
compliance, mootness, and ripeness.189 The question of whether a stay
applicant stands to suffer irreparable harm requires a sensitive and
complex judgment. Regardless of the advisability of undertaking this
inquiry in the context of “regular” stay decisions, there is little reason
to extend the irreparable harm analysis into the even more timepressured frame of administrative stays. To be sure, courts will
examine the harm litigants stand to incur as part of this Article’s
proposal. But the irreparability of the harm, as an on-off switch, should
not be treated as a precondition for an administrative stay.
As to the “public interest,” this is another traditional stay factor,190
and one might ask whether courts granting administrative stays should
take this factor into account. On the one hand, a “public interest”
analysis allows courts to account for the broader implications of their
rulings. A public interest analysis may be viewed as especially
appropriate when federal courts are sitting in equity; as the Supreme
Court has stated, “Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved.”191
On the other hand, a “public interest” analysis introduces a
further degree of discretion into courts’ decision-making processes.
Take the Ninth Circuit decision denying an administrative stay of a
district-court decision allowing the census count to proceed.192 Where
would the public interest lie—in allowing the census count to
continue, or in accepting the federal government’s view that an earlier
halt to operations was needed to satisfy congressional deadlines for
completing the census? Nken might suggest that the government
represents the public interest,193 but some courts might be inclined to
interpret the public interest more broadly. Delving into the public
interest at the administrative stay stage would seem to embroil courts
in contentious reasoning that would be detrimental along the
consistency and legitimacy axes.
On balance, it is prudent for courts not to treat the public interest
as an independent factor in determining whether to grant an
administrative stay. Yet courts need not ignore the impact of an
administrative stay on the world beyond the parties to the case. In the
kind of litigation that has recently provoked debate over administrative
189
(1990).
190
191
192
193

Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 692
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435–36 (2009); see supra subsection I.B.3.
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 698, 703 (9th Cir. 2020).
Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.
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stays in high-profile cases, the parties frequently include federal and
state governments, or public interest organizations—parties with
interests that extend more broadly than those of individuals. Courts
could consider these interests in determining whether a stay applicant
would be able to benefit from a stay pending appeal were an
administrative stay denied, or whether a prevailing party would be able
to secure the benefit of the ruling in its favor were an administrative
stay granted. For example, an organization that represents asylum
applicants has an interest in rolling back restrictive immigration rules
for the benefit of numerous individuals, beyond the parties to the case.
A state government has an interest in enforcing its laws for the benefit
of the state’s citizenry. Courts could draw on doctrine concerning
organizational standing194 and parens patriae standing195 to elucidate
the nature of the interests that parties before the court can protect.
Therefore, the proposed inquiry does not include an admonition
to preserve the status quo, to act only to prevent irreparable harm, or
to consider the public interest explicitly. As noted, the principles
underlying these doctrinal concepts will likely bleed into the proposed
analysis of the marginal impact on each party should an administrative
stay be granted or denied. But the Article’s proposed framework
involves a more general inquiry into the effects of granting or denying
an administrative stay on the parties’ ability to benefit from a stay
pending appeal or from the judgment.
D. Application to Examples
This Section applies the administrative stay proposal described
above to concrete examples. The aim is not to produce a single
response on whether or not an administrative stay should have been
granted, but to show how courts could reason through these decisions.
1. Asylum Eligibility Case
One example comes from a Ninth Circuit case in which the court
declined to grant an administrative stay in an asylum-related case.196 In
2018, the Trump administration adopted a policy that effectively
“[made] asylum unavailable to any alien who seeks refuge in the
United States if she entered the country from Mexico outside a lawful
port of entry.”197 Organizations representing asylum applicants sued,

194 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977).
195 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
196 Order at 1, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018) (No.
18-17274) [hereinafter East Bay Order].
197 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 755.

1980

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

and the district court entered a temporary restraining order against
the policy.198 The Trump administration appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, seeking a stay pending appeal and an administrative stay.199
The Ninth Circuit, in an unexplained order, denied an administrative
stay;200 six days later, it issued an opinion denying the motion for a stay
pending appeal.201
Applying the administrative stay proposal discussed above: the
Ninth Circuit’s order denying an administrative stay, though it did not
explain the court’s decision, issued a briefing schedule for the stay
pending appeal.202 The briefing schedule was highly expedited, calling
for briefing on the stay pending appeal to be completed within three
days.203 These features of the Ninth Circuit’s procedures were salutary,
as they publicly conveyed that the denial of an administrative stay was
a temporary decision and that a fuller hearing was forthcoming.
Further, the Trump administration requested an administrative stay,
so that criterion was satisfied.
The “nonfrivolity on the merits” standard was met as well.
Without diving deeply here into the legality of the asylum policy, I note
that the Ninth Circuit panel decision included a partial dissent,204 and
that when the case reached the Supreme Court on an emergency stay
application, four Justices stated they disagreed with the Supreme
Court’s decision not to grant a stay.205 These points do not
demonstrate that the district court was incorrect to block enforcement
of the asylum policy; but they provide some evidence that the appeal
was not frivolous on the merits.
The next step is to consider whether the stay applicant, the federal
government, would still have been able to benefit from a stay pending
appeal were an administrative stay denied. The answer to this question
depends on the nature of the benefit to the federal government. One
potential benefit—suggested by the government’s arguments—was
vindication of the separation of powers and the principle of executive
prerogative.206 The government would have been able to recoup this
benefit from a stay pending appeal to a significant extent even if an
administrative stay were denied, as separation-of-powers principles

198 Id. at 755. Although a temporary restraining order is ordinarily not appealable, the
Ninth Circuit treated the order as an appealable preliminary injunction. See id. at 762.
199 Id. at 762.
200 East Bay Order, supra note 196, at 1.
201 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 780.
202 East Bay Order, supra note 196, at 1.
203 Id.
204 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 780 (Leavy, J., dissenting in part).
205 Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018) (mem.).
206 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 778.
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could ultimately have been vindicated.207 Another possible benefit—
also reflected in the government’s arguments—consisted in stopping
individuals from entering the United States illegally.208
The
government’s ability to secure that benefit notwithstanding denial of
an administrative stay would depend on the facts. The government
might be able to explain why the short period between the
administrative-stay and stay-pending-appeal stages would importantly
affect immigration patterns.
But absent such evidence, the
government would still be able to benefit substantially from a stay
pending appeal even if an administrative stay were denied.
The “flip side” is the extent to which the party that secured a
ruling in its favor—the organizations representing asylum applicants—
would be able to maintain the benefit of the ruling were an
administrative stay granted. Here again the analysis is factually
specific. To the extent that asylum applicants could wait to apply for
asylum until after the stay-pending-appeal stage, the case for granting
an administrative stay (and allowing the new asylum rules to go into
effect) would become stronger. But the organizations might be able
to make a showing that the government’s policy endangered asylum
applicants even during a short period. If courts were inclined to
consider only harm to the organizational plaintiffs instead of harm to
asylum applicants, then the organizations’ case would become harder.
The organizations contended that they would be required to divert
resources in response to the government’s policy.209 To undermine
the case for an administrative stay, the organizations would need to
show that they would have to divert sufficient resources for the period
of the administrative stay to weaken their ability to benefit from the
district court’s ruling in their favor.
Overall, neither party in the asylum case had a clear-cut case as to
why an administrative stay should have been granted or denied. The
proper outcome depends on factually specific issues.
The
considerations discussed above, however, provide a way to structure
the inquiry. In particular, they suggest the need to focus on the
consequences for parties during the specific period that an
administrative stay would be in effect.
2. Abortion Restrictions during the Pandemic
A second example brings us back to a case discussed in the
introduction: the Fifth Circuit case regarding restrictions on medical
procedures, including abortion, during the beginning of the
207
208
209

See id.
See id.
Id.
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coronavirus pandemic.210 To recap, the Texas Governor issued an
order in March 2020 postponing “non-essential surgeries and
procedures” for three weeks, without excluding abortion.211 A district
court entered temporary restraining orders as to certain categories of
abortion procedures; Texas officials appealed, and the Fifth Circuit
granted an administrative stay, albeit a partial one with a carve-out as
to women who would be past the legal limit for an abortion in Texas
by the time the Governor’s order expired.212
Texas officials requested an administrative stay,213 so that criterion
was satisfied. The Fifth Circuit, in granting a partial administrative stay,
set a briefing schedule for the broader stay proceedings that called for
a response and reply within three days.214 In doing so, the court
conveyed that the administrative stay was short-term in nature. In
response to a motion to dissolve the administrative stay, the court
issued an opinion—a day after granting the administrative stay—
explaining its conclusion to maintain the stay.215 The opinion stated
that “[e]ntering temporary administrative stays so that a panel may
consider expedited briefing in emergency cases is a routine practice in
our court.”216 Although the reference to “routine practice” did not
fully account for the measure of discretion that a court has in deciding
whether to grant an administrative stay,217 the panel appropriately
linked the administrative stay to another form of emergency relief. As
to the merits, the Texas officials’ appeal appears to clear the bar of
nonfrivolity given the public health crisis and uncertainty about the
pandemic in the spring of 2020, regardless of whether the appeal was
likely to succeed on the merits.
Would Texas officials still be able to benefit from a stay pending
appeal were an administrative stay denied? The answer to this question
depends substantially on factual questions—specifically, the nature of
the pandemic-related harms the Texas officials alleged. The more they
could show that abortion procedures would cause significant publichealth problems in the few days before a stay pending appeal was
granted, the more likely they could demonstrate the need for an
administrative stay. A general assertion that the public health would
suffer if abortion procedures were permitted would not be enough.
210 In re Abbott (Abbott II), 800 F. App’x 293 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
211 In re Abbott (Abbott I), 954 F.3d 772, 777–778 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott V), 141 S. Ct. 1261
(2021) (mem.).
212 See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
213 Abbott II, 800 F. App’x at 296.
214 Id.
215 In re Abbott (Abbott III), 800 F. App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
216 Id.
217 See id. (Dennis, J. dissenting).
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On the flip side, would the plaintiffs challenging the Texas policy
still be able to benefit from the district court’s ruling in their favor were
an administrative stay granted? If the administrative stay had blocked
the district court’s ruling with respect to women who would have
crossed the legal limit for abortion in Texas during the pendency of
the administrative stay, then the answer would be “no.” The Fifth
Circuit’s administrative stay, however, excluded “women who would be
past the legal limit for abortion in Texas” during the pendency of the
Governor’s order.218 That does not end the inquiry into the
consequences of granting an administrative stay. Judge Dennis
observed, dissenting from the Fifth Circuit’s decision to maintain an
administrative stay, that the district court had made findings with
respect to increased difficulties that women who would not cross the
legal limit would nonetheless face in seeking an abortion.219 It would
be advisable for a court to train attention on the extent to which
women would encounter these difficulties during the specific period
of the administrative stay. In other words, a court should consider the
prospect that a few days could make a difference in terms of women’s
access to abortion even if it did not render abortion completely illegal
for those women.
Weighing that prospect against the public-health issues the Texas
officials referenced requires discretion. More generally, the issue of
how to apply the administrative stay factors discussed here is not
amenable to mechanical calculation and is heavily fact dependent. But
the standards discussed above provide guidance as to the types of
questions that courts should be asking.
CONCUSION
The administrative stay mechanism has become a generally used
tool for federal courts to manage emergency litigation, with little
analysis of the standards that courts should apply or the source of their
authority to issue such stays. This Article has aimed to bring
administrative stays into the light. It has highlighted trends and
ambiguities in courts’ treatment of administrative stays; analyzed
sources of authority for federal courts to issue administrative stays; and
offered a proposal as to the factors that courts should consider in
deciding whether to impose administrative stays. Beyond the specifics
of the proposal, the aim is to illuminate the choices and tradeoffs that
courts face when considering which administrative stay standards to
adopt.
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The topic of administrative stays has broader implications for
federal-court theory and practice. First, judicial functions that might
appear to be purely ministerial or routine actually call on courts to
exercise discretion and can have a significant impact on the ground.
Case management might seem to be a mundane topic, but it raises
important issues about judicial decisionmaking, including in situations
that do not receive much public attention. Second, administrative
stays highlight the balance between flexibility and consistency that
courts confront in exercising their equitable authority. On the one
hand, the decision about whether to issue an administrative stay calls
on courts to be nimble and to respond quickly to changed
circumstances. On the other hand, decisionmaking that is too ad hoc
runs the risk of undercutting impartiality and reducing legitimacy.
Third, administrative stays underscore the difficulty of devising
value-neutral mechanisms for guiding courts’ exercise of their
discretion. The call to “preserve the status quo,” for example, is not as
mechanical and uncontested as it may initially seem. The standards
proposed here are meant to limit the influence of merits-based
reasoning in the decision whether to grant an administrative stay. Yet
decisionmakers will take different views of factors such as the ability of
a stay applicant to secure a benefit from a stay pending appeal, or the
ability of a prevailing party to maintain the benefit of a district court’s
ruling in its favor. The procedural benefits of regularizing the inquiry
into administrative stay decisions do not eliminate that issue, but they
represent a step forward.
None of this is to say that procedure or transparency is an
unalloyed good. At times, an interest in compromise or in the passive
virtues may lead judges to act summarily, including with administrative
stays. That practice may sometimes be preferable to setting bold
precedent, especially when courts are acting under time pressure. But
the decision about how to approach administrative stays should be a
considered one, made after assessing the benefits and drawbacks of
various possibilities. This Article has analyzed current and potential
practices with respect to administrative stays in order to advance the
conversation about how federal courts should wield this tool.

